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Distribution and Production Implications of Land Reform 
Mark Gersovitz 
Abstract 
This paper discusses alternative explanations of the empirically 
established inverse relation between the size of farm and the output-land 
and labour-land ratios used in •~r1.cultural production in less developed 
countries. The analysis establishes the implications ~f the various explana­
tions for changes in income distribution and the volume of agricultural 
output associated with different types of.land refom programs. These im­
plications are rather heterogeneous, and are extremely sensitive to the 
particular explanation of the production ratio pattern which is adopted. 
Distribution and Production Implications of Land Reform* 
Mark Gersovitz 
The common characteristic .of the many diverse land reform schemes is 
that they all involve the re-allocation of land ownership. This re-alloca­
tion of factor ownership is, of course, accompanied by a redistribution of 
income and a change in the size of the producing units. These changes, in 
their turn, have implications for the volume of agricultural output. 
A large empirical literature discusses evidence on the relationship 
bet~een fann size (measured in acres) and output in less developed countries. 1 
The concensus is that there exists an inverse relation between farm size and 
output per acre. Further, there is some evidence of an inverse relation be­
tween the labour-land ratio and farm size. 2 These empirical relationships 
have been widely construed as justifying land reforms which break up large 
holdings as likely to increase agricultural output. Thus, Dorner concludes: 
"The dilemma of the hard choices countries must make - between distributive 
justice and economic efficiency or advancement - is not a real issue."3,4 
*I am grateful to Robert E. Evenson and James L. McCabe who made helpfulcomments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1For a survey of some evidence see Peter Dorner and Don Kanel, "The EconomicCase for Land Reform" in Peter Dorner (ed.), Land Reform in Latin America,Madison, 1971. 
2Peter Dorner, Land Reform & Economic Development, Harmondsworth, 1972, pp.101-103. 
3Toid., p.141. 
4As well, see E. J. Long, "The Economic Basis of Land Reform in UnderdevelopedCountries", Land Economics, vol. 37 (1961), p.115. 
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Berry has dissented from this optimistic view. Investigating a model 
with three groups (landless labourers, small farmers and large landowners), 
Berry argued that "while land redistribution may be expected to raise agri­
cultural output in any cases, it may well worsen the distribution of income 
by lowering the demand for hired labour. 11 5 Cases where- landless labourers 
can be hurt are characterized by a redistribution of land from landowners to 
small farmers. 
Before the relationship between land refom, income distribution and 
production can be established, it is imperative that the mechanism by which 
farms of different sizes operate with different output-land and labour-land 
ratios is explicitly integrated into the analysis. While many reasons hav-e 
been suggested to explain the phenomenon of differing production ratios, 
differences in their implications for income distribution and production within 
the context of land refom have not been investigated. Among the reasons 
given for the observed differences in these ratios, three deserve special 
attention. For ease of refet-ence, they may be labelled as the measurement, 
market failure and large landowner inefficiency explanations. -
Two basic pre-reform situations with correspondingly different land 
-reform schemes may be distinguished. In the simplest (A) case, there are only 
t110 groups, landowners and landless labourers. Since there are no small farms, 
any assessment of production ratio differences between differant sized units 
must base itself on cross-country comparisons. It is assumed that production 
ratio relationships observed in countries with small farms would be valid in 
the country under consideration if it were also to have a small farm sector. 
Alternatively, the country under consideration may be assumed to have a small 
5R. Albert Berry, "Land Refom and the Agricultural IncOllle Distribution", 




f ann. sector which is insignificant in size, but whose behaviour nonetheless 
substantiates the expected productipn ratio pattern. Under either inteiyre­
tation, the relevant land refonn scheme is one of all land to the landless 
labourers. 
The second pre-reform situation is the Berry (B) case, with landowners, 
small (landowning) fann.eps and landless labourers. In this case, the land 
refonn. scheme under consideration is one of all land to the small farmers. A 
scheme which re-allocated land to both small fann.ers and landless labourers 
would be similar to case A. Thus, the A and B cases can be considered as 
polar situations. 
Throughout the analysis, the focus is on the decision individuals 
make between leisure and consumption. The agricultural sector under examina­
tion is assumed to be part of an economy wlaich is small relative to the world 
economy so,ithat its relative prices are given by the international market. In 
particular, the .relative prices of agricultural and non-agricultural goods 
are assumed constant, pemitting the suppression of non-agricultural goods in 
the analysis. Initially, it is assumed that labour is 1-obile between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. This assumption is subsequently 
removed without qualifying the results to any significant degree. 
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Land Reform and the Measurement E]cplanation: 
A measurement explanation of the difference iri production ratios 
simply asserts that land is nonhomogeneous and that this non-homogeneity leads 
to the observed production ratio relationships. Under assumptions of perfect 
competition-, all farms would operate with the same production ratios when land 
is measured in fertility equivalent acres. In empirical work, however, land 
is measured in yardstick acres and fams composed of lress fertile land will 
have lower o~tput-land and labour-land ratios. 
Further, there is a natural tendency for farms whose land is less fer­
tile to domin•te the larger size groups. Consider a simple .,case with only two 
grades of land, typ·e one of $Uperior f ertilit,- and type tw<;> of inferior fertil­
ity. Suppose that the distribution of faffl; size functions for farms composed 
of the two,types of land are f 1(x) and r2(x) where xis fam size in yardstick 
acres. Let one yardstick acre of type one land be a l!ftandard fertility acre 
and let k) 1 yardstick ~cres of type two land equal one standa:rd fertility 
acre. Assume that there are equal amounts of standard fertility acres of each 
tyPe,·and, further, that r1(x) = f 2(kx). Then, the di~tribution for all farms 
is F(x) = [f1(x)+r2(x)J/2, and fams with type two land and low production 
ratios tend to dominate the large size classes (Figure I). 
While the asSllllption of non~homogeneous land provides a complete 
explanation for observed variations in product.ion ratios, it is fully compa­
tible with the usual co111petitive assumptions. Indeed,_when land is measured 
in equivalent fertility acres, the non-homogeneous land model reduces to the 
simple competitive model. For convenience, therefore, all land is assumed 
to be standardized. The analysis is relevant to both the competitive case and 
to the non-hOP1ogeneous land case after a retranslation of results from standard 





In Figure IIa, the pre-reform equilibrium of the agricultural sector 
is illustrated under ease A assUMptions, output as a function of labour input, 
given the amount of land, is given by the cu?'Ve AB, Labour input is measured 
from right to left starting at the origin B,. The production function AB can 
then be interpreted as a production possibility frontier between agricultural 
output and leisure with respect to the origin O. OB is the total amount of 
time available to the land'less labourer commu.nity. A set of this group• s 
community indifference curves is plotted with origin o. The •ge is assuaed 
equal to the m&rginal product of labour given by the slope of the line E D 
0 
equal to the slope· of the line ·ca. Equilibrium will be characterized by two 
points such as E
0 
and E1 , with demand for labour equal to supply of labour. 
Now consider a land refrom which transfers all land to the landless 
labourers. Assume that neither leisure nor agricutural goods are inferior. 
At a (shadow) wage_ given by the slope of the old wage line E D, ,the landless0 
labourer community will reach the highest level of utility somewhere along 
E
0 
J, say at E2• This position is not, however, a final equilibirium since the 
production of leisU?'e and the agricultural good (given by point E0 ) is not 
equal to the d0Jft8.nd for leisure and the agricultural good (given by·point E2). 
Final equilibrium is attained at sonte point elong the arc E0K, say at EJ° 
At E3, the total output of the agricultural good has fallen. Thus, 
the measurement explanation under case A assumptions leads to an unaabiguous 
decline in agricultural output following land reform. This, result is associ­
ated with.the role which leisure, as a nom.al good, plays in the determination 
of the level of labour input. Consumption (and welfare) of the landless 
laboU?'er COffllllunity has, of course, increased. 
Equilibrium under case B assUlllptions is illustrated for the small 
















IIIa, the small farmer group's indifference map is drawn with origin O, 
curve AB is a production possibility frontier given the 8.Jllount of land held 
by small farmers and total time available to small farmers is OB. With the 
equilibrium wage given by the slope of E D (equal to the slopes of e d and
0 0 
cf in Figure IIIb), small farmers wish to work FG (equal to fb in Figure IIIb) 
hours on the landowners' land. 
In Figure IIIb, the landless labourer group is assumed to have an 
indifference map With origin o, ab is a production possibility frontier given 
the amount of land owned by landowners, and total tim.e available to landless 
labourers· is of. Equilibrium is given by a pair of points e0 and e1 with 
demand for labour on the part of landowners equal to the s~pply of labour 
from small farmers and landless labourers. 
Now consider a land reform scheme which transfers all land to the 
small fal"llers. The consequent shift out in the production possibility fron­
tier facing the small famers leads to a decline in the_amo\lilt of work they 
are willing to perfom at any wage. This result is illustrated in Figure IVa, 
and is dependent on the assumption of the non-inferiority of leisure. ~ 
A supply of labour function can be defined as the ~um of the work 
done by landless labourers and that done by small famers (given the amount 
of land .they own) at any 11B.ge rate. A demand for labour function can be 
defined as the sum. of the amount of labour used on the 1._nq,originally be­
lon~ing to small famers and on that originally belonging tp landowners. In 
the case under consideration, the fall in labour supplied py the small farmers 
shifts the supply of labour function up. The demand for l~bour schedule, deter­
mined by the marginal product of labour (given the total &lftpunt of land) remains 
constant. As a result, the wage rises, output falls and both small farmers 
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Figure !Yb 
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Thus, under assumptions of competition and non-homogeneous land, land 
reform leads to output contraction in both cases A and B. The welfare of 
groups other than the expropriated landowners always increases. While this 
analysis provides an important benchmark, an assessment of the optimists• 
position must consider the output implications of land reform when the market 
failure and inefficiency explanations hold. It is on the basis of these ex­
planations that the optimists hold their views. -
-12-
Land Refom and the Market Failure Explanation, 
A .market failure explanation of differences in output-land and labour­
land ratios concentrates on imperfections in the land and labour markets in 
ll>C agricultural sectors. Many small fan1ters, given the amount of land they 
own, the wage rate and the rental rate on land, would like either to tent more 
land or to allocate part of their time to working off their farms. Opportuni­
ties for factor ratio adjustments of this nature may, however, be limited or 
unavailable. Small tamers are then confined to working only their own land. 
These circU!ll.stances lead small famers to operate with higher output­
land and labour-land ratios than large f&l'fflS. Equilibr1ll1'1 in the agricultural 
sector under market failure is illustrated in Figures Va and b. Figure Va 
repeats the infomation on the S11tall farms contained in Figure IIIa. Under 
the assUl'llption of lllllrket failure, however, aquilibrillltl cannot occur at E
0 
since E implies that small famers work FG hours on the farms of large land­0 
owners. Without this opportunity, equilibrium is reached :somewhere along the 
arc HE1, say at E2• 
F,quilibrium in the landowner-landless labourer sector is illustrated 
in Figure Vb, which repeats the infonu.tion contained in Figure IIa. The 
marginal product of labour in the landowner sector (given by the slope of the 
line e d equal to the slope of E1D) exceeds that in the ~11 fam sector0 
(given by the slope of AB at E2). On assumptions of constant returns to scale 
and identical production functions in the two sectors, the output-land and la­
bour-land ratios are higher in the small fann sector. 
Sinee the representation of the landowner sector under the market 
failure and measurement explanations is identical, case A land reform has the 
same outcome under both sets of assumptions. Case Bland reform, however, is 
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and demand for labour curves are, respectively, monotonically increasing and
decreasing. 
Now consider the post-reform wage~ At a wage less than or equal to
the wage given by the slope of the production possibility frontier at E2,
small fanners will do less work than prior to the refom since they now own
more land (see Figure IVa). Since this wage is less than that received by
landless labourers in the pre-refoffl situation, landless labourers also supply
less labour. Yet, since both the land formerly held by landowners and that
originally held by small f'amers is worked more intensively, the demand f'or
labour is higher at this wage than in the pre-reform situation. Therefore,
at a wage lower than that associated with point E2 , demand for labou?- exceeds
the supply of labour and equilib?-iUlll is not possible. 
At a wage between that implied by E2 and the pre-reform wage given
at E1, the supply of labour by landless labourers continues to fall short of
its pre-refonn. level. Small fal'l'fters, however, may wish to work more than pre­
viously. Two offsetting factors influence the small farmers. The implicit
wage is now more favourable than that which they were receiving at E2, but
the additional income derived from their new lands acts to discourage addi­
tional work. Similarly, ~he demand for labour may increase or decrease. The
lands which were always owned by the small fanners are now worked less inten­
sively while the newly acquired lands are worked more intensively. Consequently,
it is possible to have an equilibrimn. in which post-reform wages are lower than
at E1 (but higher than at E2), landless labourers are worse off (the Berry
case) and either more or less output is produced relative to the pre-reform
situation. 
For wages exceeding the pre-refom wage, landless labourers wish to
supply more labour than previously. Small farmers ma.y or may not wish to
work more; their decision is based on the same considerations discussed above. 
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Less labour is demanded since both the newly acquired and the original sms.11 
farmer lands are worked less intensively. Consequently, it is possible for 
the post-reform. equilibrium to be characterized by higher wages and an improve­
ment in landless labourer welfare. Less output is produced. 
Under the market failure hYPothesis, it is impossible for equilibrium 
to be characterized by both an increase in output and an increase in the wel­
fare of landless labourers. The market failure hYPothesis leads to a rejection 
of the optimists' position under both case A and Bland refoms. 
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Land Reform and and the Inefficiency Explanations 
An inefficiency explanation asserts 'that large,,·often··absentee, land­
owners fail to •perate in a rent maximising fashion. The equilibrium of the 
small farm sector under the inefficiency hypothesis is identical with its 
position as illustrated in Figure IIIa. Figure VI reproduces Figure IIIb with 
the important additional assumption of landlord inefficiency. 
Consider an equilibrium wage given by the slope of e0 d equal to the 
slop~s of gb and cf (and to that of EJ) in Figure IIIa). Qnder the usual com­
petitive assUlllptions, with small farmers working fb (equal to FG in Figure IIIa) 
hours on landowners• land, landless labourers must be in equilibrium at point e1 
if e d is to define the equilibrium. wage. Otherwise, the demand for labour
0 
(given by the marginal product of labour) would not equal the supply of labour 
from small farmers and landless labourers. Under an inefficiency hypothesis, 
no such restriction can be placed on the equilibrium position since the demand 
for labour is no longer given by the marginal product of la.hour. 
Certain!. priori restrictions can, however, be p+aced on the equili­
brium position. Given the equilibrium wage, landless.labourers must be in 
equilibrium. somewhere along cf. Total wage payments for any amount of labour 
along bo, say bl, are given by the height of the line gb corresponding to that 
amount of labour ( e31 in the case of bl). Now, if landowners do not run their 
faffls at a loss, the total amount of output produced must at least cover the 
wage bill(.:!.•!!•, production must be along the segment he3 in the case of bl). 
These considerations restMct the production point (combination of 
labour input and output) to the area agijhe in Figure VI. (The area jib is
0 
excluded since at least fb of labour must be hired if e d is to define an
0 
equilibrium wage from the point of view of small fann.ers.) The area agijhe
0 
can be subdivided into three zones (a,~ and y) defined by the relationship 












of the small farmers {given by the point e ). In zone a, both the labour­
0 
land and the output-land ratios are higher on the large, inefficient farms 
than on the small farms. In zone~• the labour-land r~tio is higher and the 
output-land ratio is lower, and in zone y, both ratios are lower. 
Only a production point in zone y is consistent with the empirical 
production ratio pattern. Unfortunately, there are no!. priori arguments 
suggesting that a general presUil'lption of inefficiency leads to a production 
point in zone y rather than in either of the other two zones. Thus, ineffi­
ciency only provides for the possibility that production ratios correspond to 
the observed pattern, it is not a sufficient condition. 
Production and distribution implications of land reform can be ex­
amined in the context of an inefficiency explanation if the production point 
is assumed to lie in zone y, as the empirical evidence suggests. Land refonn 
under case A assumptions is illustrated in Figure VII which reproduces the 
basic structure of Figure VI for an economy without small farmers. Pre-refonn 
equilibrium is characterized by a wage {given by the slope of the. lines e d
0 
and ch), a production point {e2) and a point at which landless labourers ar-e 
in equilibrium (e1). 
If the pre-reform wage were to persist into the post-reforlit situation, 
an analysis similar to that embodied in Figures !Ia and b establishes that 
equilibriUil'l would be along ij, say at e • e3 does not, however, imply the3 
equality of the demand fo:r and supply-of labour, and equilibrium will finally 
be reached along e
0 
k, say at e4 • At 04, more or less output may be produced 
in comparison with point e2 • The optimistic outcome is, therefore, possible 
but not assured under the inefficiency explan11tion with case A assumptions. 
It can similarly be shown; by analyzing the impact of land refol'ffl on 
the demand for and supply of labour and on the intensity of cultivation, that 
output may or may not increase under case B assumptions. The wage must always 
-19-




Table I SUJIIJll&ri$eS the outcomes possible in each of the six land 
reform models considered. The heterogeneity of results underscores the :impor­
tance of an explicit1.ntegration of the different explanations of the produc­
tion ratio pattern into the analysis. The optimists• view th.at land refol'Tll 
always leads to a rise in output and an improvement in the welfare of all 
groups other than expropriated landlords is clearly refuted. Similarly, only 
in the context of the market failure explanation can ~ne observe the Berry 
result of an immiserization of the landless labourers. 
The implications of intersectoral labour flows following on a land 
reform program are easily established. Assume that wages are initially 
equal between sectors and that an inverse relation exists between wages and 
the quantity of labour input deu.nded in the non-agricultural sector. Recall 
the assumption of·a fixed relative price between agric.ultu~al and non-agricul­
tural goods. 
If the post-reform (actual or illlplicit) agricultu:ral wage as deter­
mined in the preceding three sections exceeds the pre-refor.111- wage, labour 
will flow front the non-agricultural sector to the agricultural sector. This 
adjustment will lower the wage in agriculture and raise the wage in the other 
sector until wage equality is restored. The final equilibrium wage will be 
intenuediate between the pre-reform wage and the post-reform wage as calculated 
by the preceding partial equilibrium analysis. Similar results are obtained 
if the partial equilibri.Ulll analysis establishes that the pre.reform wage would 
exceed the post-refom wage. T~us, general equilibrium considerations stres­
sing the intersectoral re-allocation of labour following on land refom do 
not affect the quali-qttive conclusions of the partial equilibrium analysis as 
displayed in Table I. 
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Measurement Market Failure lhefficienc 
·-- . ~ 
Case A 
output output output 
up down up down up dowr 
I X X X I X 
Case B 
out(2ut output outr2ut 
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